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A B S T R A C T   
Objectives: Antibacterial resistance (ABR) is a major global health security threat, with a disproportionate burden 
on lower-and middle-income countries (LMICs). It is not understood how ‘One Health’, where human health is 
co-dependent on animal health and the environment, might impact the burden of ABR in LMICs. Thailand’s 2017 
“National Strategic Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance” (NSP-AMR) aims to reduce AMR morbidity by 50% 
through 20% reductions in human and 30% in animal antibacterial use (ABU). There is a need to understand the 
implications of such a plan within a One Health perspective. 
Methods: A model of ABU, gut colonisation with extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing bacteria 
and transmission was calibrated using estimates of the prevalence of ESBL-producing bacteria in Thailand. This 
model was used to project the reduction in human ABR over 20 years (2020–2040) for each One Health driver, 
including individual transmission rates between humans, animals and the environment, and to estimate the long- 
term impact of the NSP-AMR intervention. 
Results: The model predicts that human ABU was the most important factor in reducing the colonisation of 
humans with resistant bacteria (maximum 65.7–99.7% reduction). The NSP-AMR is projected to reduce human 
colonisation by 6.0–18.8%, with more ambitious targets (30% reductions in human ABU) increasing this to 
8.5–24.9%. 
Conclusions: Our model provides a simple framework to explain the mechanisms underpinning ABR, suggesting 
that future interventions targeting the simultaneous reduction of transmission and ABU would help to control 
ABR more effectively in Thailand.   
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1. Introduction 
Antimicrobials have played an important role in the treatment and 
prevention of infectious diseases, have enabled food production to 
intensify and have greatly improved the lives of many millions of people. 
However, the emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) 
threatens to undermine this progress, with drug-resistant pathogens 
projected to cause ten million annual deaths by 2050 [1]. Hence AMR is 
regarded as a major global health security issue [2], with many member 
states of the World Health Organization adopting national action plans 
(with different stages of financing and implementation) in order to 
tackle the growing threat of AMR [3]. 
AMR, particularly Antibacterial Resistance (ABR), occurs at the 
interface of a multifaceted One Health system; human health is thought 
to not only depend on the human population’s health-related behaviour, 
but also on industrial, farming and veterinary practices as well as 
environmental conditions [4]. In the context of ABR, these diverse 
drivers can be separated into two components: “selection”, predomi-
nantly by antibacterial use (ABU) and “transmission” of resistant or-
ganisms between each connected compartment on a human-animal- 
environment axis. In terms of selection, the majority of global ABU is 
within animals raised for food (73%, [5,6]) and it is generally accepted 
that ABU in animals drives ABR [7], although the magnitudes of these 
effects are poorly characterised and are likely to be antibacterial, 
resistance mechanism and organism specific. However, ABU within 
human populations (of which up to 50% has been suggested to be un-
necessary [8]) is also a fundamental driver of ABR [9]. In terms of 
transmission, sharing of resistant bacteria between humans, animals and 
the environment can occur via human-human contact (open community, 
contact with patients, household transmission, contact in workplaces, 
travellers), human-animal contact (occupational contact with farm an-
imals, food consumption or preparation), animal-animal contact 
(relating to farming practices, or movement of wild or domesticated 
animals), and human-environment or animal-environment interfaces 
(sewage and manure, habitat, drinking water, bathing, leisure activities, 
food sources and soil) [10]. Crucially, we do not know the full extent to 
which the listed factors of selection and transmission lead to the 
currently observed growing prevalence of ABR and increasing incidence 
of drug-resistant infections. 
Selection and transmission of ABR are not entirely independent. ABU 
drives selection of pre-existing resistant bacteria through population- 
level mechanisms [11], while simultaneously selecting for successful 
transmission of resistance into the bacterial population (either via the 
transmission of mobile genetic elements between microorganisms or 
through direct transmission of the microorganisms themselves) [7]. 
Therefore, while ABU in humans and animals, contamination of the 
environment from those sources or ABU within non-animal agriculture 
are thought to generally increase the prevalence of ABR, the relationship 
between ABU and resistance is highly complex and dependent on pre- 
existing bacterial population structures [7]. To account for this, previ-
ous studies have suggested that no single ‘silver bullet’ solution exists. 
Rather, that preventing and reducing the burden of ABR within a One 
Health system should take a multifactorial, coordinated approach 
focussing on the specifics of ABU, and the types and prevalence of ABR 
in each system, while considering the potential interactions within and 
between compartments [7]. It should also take a multi-sector, trans-
disciplinary, collaborative approach. One Health is a relatively recent 
global policy framing of ABR [12] and to date, while animal health has 
been increasingly included in national policies and action plans, the 
environment has been given less emphasis [13,14]. One Health ap-
proaches are promoted widely in the field, yet the relative contributions 
of different drivers or the impacts of different interventions are not 
known, and remain unquantified [10]. Quantification could aid the 
prioritisation of interventions and refine policy approaches in the 
inherently complex field of ABR. 
While ABR is a global issue [15], there is a disproportionate burden 
of infectious diseases in lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
[16]. While these countries experience higher rates of infection (up to 
three times greater than high income countries [17]), emerging evi-
dence suggests the burden of ABR is greater in LMICs [18] while 
simultaneously there is limited access to essential antibacterials [8]. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, research focussed on modelling ABR within 
lower- and middle-income Southeast Asian countries is vastly under-
represented when compared to European or African studies (eight 
published models in South-East Asia, 35 in Africa and 42 in Europe 
[19]), especially when considering that the prevalence of extended- 
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Escherichia coli (i.e. a key 
resistance mechanism and pathogen relevant to human and animal 
health and a sentinel for One Health ABR) in Southeast Asia is high (22% 
in Southeast Asia compared to 4% in Europe [18]). 
Here we focus on the specific national setting of Thailand, an upper- 
middle income country in Southeast Asia with a high burden of ABR 
relative to other countries [20] which affects both human health 
(88,000 infections, 38,000 deaths attributed to ABR per year in 2010) 
and the economy (direct costs of $70–170 million to treat ABR, indirect 
costs at least $1100 million for morbidity in 2010) [21]. The prevalence 
of faecal colonisation with ESBL-producing E. coli among healthy 
humans in selected communities in Thailand has grown from 0% in 2004 
[22] to 69% in 2010 [23] and 74% in 2012 [24]. In response to the 
threat posed by rising ABR, the Thai cabinet implemented their first five- 
year policy in 2016, the “National Strategic Plan on Antimicrobial 
Resistance in Thailand” (NSP-AMR) running until 2021 [25]. The NSP- 
AMR reflects the strategic objectives of the WHO Global Action Plan [3] 
and aims to reduce AMR morbidity in Thailand by 50% through 20% 
reductions in AMU in humans, 30% reductions in AMU in animals and 
20% increases in public knowledge on AMR (including awareness of 
AMU) by 2021 [25]. 
We aim to quantify the relative contributions to the human ABR 
burden (% colonisation with resistant bacteria) of human, animal and 
environmental factors (including ABU and transmission of ABR bacteria) 
within a One Health system in Thailand. We propose a simple mathe-
matical framework for the spread of ABR between these compartments 
from which we will explore and assess national interventions aimed at 
reducing ABR. Our objective is to assess and compare a wide variety of 
One Health drivers and provide insights into the multifaceted problem of 
ABR. This simple model is intended to stimulate further discussion on 
how best to reduce the burden of ABR in human populations and to 
provide the much needed first step in providing a workable One Health 
modelling framework. 
2. Materials and methods 
We built a compartmental model of ordinary differential equations 
(ODEs) to describe the relationship between resistant bacteria in three 
compartments: humans, animals and the environment. We considered 
the fraction of all humans colonised with resistant bacteria (H), the 
fraction of animals with resistant bacteria (A) and the fraction of envi-
ronmental samples with resistant bacteria (E) based on the framework of 
a previously published model of animal-human transmission [26]. Here, 
we assume that the bacteria are ESBL-producing E. coli, and human/ 
animal colonisation is assumed to be of the gut and via the faecal-oral 
route. Given our use of a sentinel pre-evolved resistance mechanism, 
de novo selection of resistance within a compartment is not considered 
significant. 
We assumed that resistance develops from two sources; antibacterial 
use (Box 1A, which selects resistant bacteria already present in the host) 
and transmission from other compartments (Box 1B, which is also 
dependent on antibacterial use in those compartments). 
First, resistance develops in humans from exposure to antibacterials, 
proportional to their usage in medicine ΛH, the rate at which humans are 
colonised with resistant bacteria, γ, and the fraction of humans not 
already colonised (1 − H). In a similar fashion, resistance develops in 
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animals proportional to antibacterial usage in animal, veterinary and 
farm practices ΛA, the rate at which animals are colonised with resistant 
bacteria, γ, and the proportion of animals not already colonised (1 − A) 
(Box 1A). 
ΛE represents the presence of antibacterial in the environment 
(derived from factories, pollution, wastewater etc), while (1 − E) rep-
resents the proportion of environmental samples negative for ABR 
bacteria. We assumed that the prevalence (percent of humans, animals 
or environmental samples that have resistant bacteria) of ABR bacteria 
declined at rates μH, μA and μE within humans, animals and the envi-
ronment respectively. 
Second, we assumed that humans negative for ABR bacteria are 
exposed to and acquire resistant bacteria from other humans at rate βHH 
(representing transmission in the open community and from patients, 
farm workers and other high-risk groups). Acquisition in this context 
means the combined effects of stable colonisation with a resistant bac-
terium following transfer, and infiltration of mobile resistance genes (e. 
g. via plasmid) into the existing bacterial flora following transient 
colonisation with a transferred resistant bacterium. Similarly, animal-to- 
animal acquisition of resistance occurs at rate βAA, and animal-to-human 
transfer of resistance occurs at rate βAH (representing contact with ani-
mals and food consumption). Human-to-animal transmission of resis-
tance occurs at rate βHA, however this rate is smaller than the animal-to- 
human rate βAH (as livestock to human jumps occur more frequently 
over evolutionary history than vice versa [10]). Similarly, the rates of 
acquisition of resistance occur at βEH for environment-to-human 
(drinking water, non-animal food sources, swimming and bathing in 
freshwater), βEA for environment-to-animal (habitat, food sources, 
drinking water), βHE for human-to-environment (transfer through 
sewage) and βAE for animal-to-environment (manure, or composting of 
dead animals). We assumed that transmission from the environment to 
animals was greater than that of the environment to humans (βEA > βEH), 
as a previous study showed that there were higher proportions of shared 
bacterial genera in wastewater and animals, as opposed to shared bac-
terial genera in wastewater and humans [27]. We also assumed that the 
transmission within populations of humans and animals is greater than 
the transmission between these populations and the transmission from 
the environment to these populations (βHH > βAH, βEH and βAA > βHA, 
βEA). These assumptions are summarised in Table S2. 
We assumed that all rates of transmission are proportional to expo-
sure with antibiotics, due to treatment eradicating susceptible bacteria 
in the host thereby enabling colonisation by incoming resistant bacteria 
(Box 1B, [11]). Therefore, the dynamics for the fraction of humans, 
animals and the environment with resistant bacteria is represented by 
the following ordinary differential equation model (Fig. 1): 
dH
dt
=γΛH(1− H)+ΛHβHHH(1− H)+ΛHβAHA(1− H)+ΛHβEHE(1− H)− μHH   
dA
dt
= γΛA(1 − A)+ΛAβAAA(1 − A)+ΛAβHAH(1 − A)+ΛAβEAE(1 − A) − μAA  
dE
dt
= ΛEβEEE(1 − E)+ΛEβHEH(1 − E)+ΛEβAEA(1 − E) − μEE 
For example, the rate of change over time for the fraction of humans 
with resistant bacteria dHdt = the rate at which susceptible humans 
become colonised with resistant bacteria γΛH(1 − H) + the transmission 
from humans with ABR to susceptible humans ΛHβHHH(1 − H) + the 
transmission from animals with ABR to susceptible humans ΛHβAHA 
(1 − H) + the transmission of resistant bacteria in the environment to 
susceptible humans ΛHβEHE(1 − H) – the loss of resistance μHH at each 
time point. 
We assumed that ΛA > ΛH as the majority of global ABU is within 
animals raised for food (73%, [5,6]). We further assumed that ABU is 
greater in humans when compared to the amounts present in the envi-
ronment ΛH > ΛE, and that the rates of loss of resistance are equal in all 
three settings (μH = μA = μE) in the absence of data on decay of resistance 
within different compartments. 
The model was coded and numerically simulated using R v.1.2.5019. 
ODEs were solved using functions deSolve and ode in R. 
We identified estimates (Table 1) for the prevalence of gut coloni-
sation with ESBL-producing E. coli in Thailand for healthy humans 
across an eight-year timeframe (2004–2012) [22–24,28,29], estimates 
of sample level positivity for resistant bacteria in rectal swabs from 
animals and fresh food from Thailand in 2012–2013 [24], and envi-
ronmental estimates of the proportion of bacteria that are resistant in 
Thailand from canal water sources [24], stagnant water on food animal 
farms, and liquid from hospital wastewater treatment tanks [30]. These 
data were used to calculate lower and upper bounds (95% credible in-
tervals) in order to calibrate our model to a national-level Thailand- 
specific setting. 
We assumed the widest possible range for parameters with no prior 
data and extrapolated based on the hierarchy of transmission (e.g. 
human-human transmission is greater or equal to animal-human trans-
mission). Therefore, we allowed human-human transmission to take any 
possible value (from 0 to 100%), while animal-to-human transmission is 
a fraction of this value (0–100% of human-human). We explored the full 
range of transmission for animal-animal, animal-environment and 
human-environment, while environment-human is a fraction of human- 
human, and human-animal and environment-animal are a fraction of the 
Box 1. Two mechanisms of resistance driven by antibacterial exposure. First, antibacterial use selects resistant bacteria already present in the compartment (A), and 
second that antibacterial use can remove susceptible populations making transmission more likely (B). In (B), it is more likely for colonisation with resistant bacteria 
to occur when the native flora have been removed (via a ‘bacteriological vacuum’ - an absence of bacteria). 
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Fig. 1. Model schematic for human-animal-environment transmission of ABR in the One Health setting.  
Table 1 
Parameters and fitting metrics used in the model (summary of 95% confidence interval uncertainty ranges). HH = human-human, AH = animal-human, AA = animal- 
animal.  
Model Parameters Parameter value (95% 
confidence interval) 
Source 
Antibacterial usage   
Animals ΛA 0–100% Majority of antimicrobials used in animals raised for food (73%, [5,6]) 
Humans ΛH 0–100% of animal use  
Environment ΛE 0–100% of human use  
Transmission of ABR  
Humans to humans βHH 0.0–100.0% Explore full parameter space 
Animals to humans βAH 0.0–100.0% of HH Fraction of βHH 
Environment to humans βEH 0.0–100.0% of HH Fraction of βHH 
Animals to animals βAA 0.0–100.0% Explore full parameter space 
Humans to animals βHA 0.0–100% of AH and AA Assume wide range, but less than βAH [10] and βAA transmission 
Environment to animals βEA (habitat/ drinking water) 0.0–100.0% of AA Fraction of βAA 
Humans to environment βHE (sewage) 0.0–100.0% Explore full parameter space 
Animals to environment βAE (manure) 0.0–100.0% Explore full parameter space 
Carriage of resistance  
Rate of loss of resistant bacteria after 12 months μH = μE = μA 0–100% Explore full parameter space 
Fitting Parameters Value (95% confidence 
interval) 
Source 
Prevalence of colonisation with ESBL-producing organisms  
Humans   
2004 0.0–0.0% 0/120 healthy adults in Thailand [22] 
2008 46.7–62.1% 87/160 healthy asymptomatic volunteers in Thailand [28] 
2009 (not included in fitting) 35.2–44.3% 177/445 healthy asymptomatic volunteers in Thailand [29] 
2010 64.9–73.7% 289/417 door to door sampling among healthy individuals in Thailand [23] 
2012 71.4–78.5% 430/574 healthy workers in a food factory and food animal farm in Thailand 
[24] 
Animals 11.1–60.3% Upper bound from rectal swabs in pigs (241/400), lower bound from fresh food 
(12/54) in Bangkok and East/North Thailand [24] 
Rectal swabs of animals, 2012–2013  
Pig 55.4–65.0% 241/400 in East/North Thailand [24] 
Broiler 26.9–48.1% 30/80 in East/North Thailand [24] 
Laying Hen 0.0–7.7% 2/61 in East/North Thailand [24] 
Fresh pork meat 0.0–25.6% 2/18 in East/North Thailand [24] 
Fresh food, 2012–2013   
Chicken 4.9–52.2% 4/14 in Bangkok & central [24] 
Pork 28.1–78.6% 8/15 in Bangkok & central [24] 
Beef 0.0–0.0% 0/11 in Bangkok & central [24] 
Fish 0.0–0.0% 0/14 in Bangkok & central [24] 
Environment 0.0–24.7% Lower bound from water in Bangkok and central province [24] and upper 
bound from stagnant water on food animal farms [24] 
Canal water, 2012–2013 0.0–19.3% 1/15 in Bangkok and central [24] 
Stagnant water on food animal farms, 2012–2013 0.0–24.7% 3/25 in Bangkok and central [24] 
Effluent fluid after treatment with chlorine prior to draining 
into a public water source from hospitals 
2.4–17.6% 6/60 in public hospitals in Thailand [30]  
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animal-animal rate (Table 1). This method ensures that we explored 
every possible scenario while maintaining the structure of the model and 
the hierarchy of the separate transmission rates. 
Similarly, we allowed ABU within animals to vary between the 
minimum and maximum values (0–100%), while human use is a fraction 
of this (less than or equal to animal use), and environmental use or 
contamination is a fraction of human use (Table 1). 
Using this available data, we defined ranges for all parameters in the 
model (Table 1), and sample between these ranges using Latin Hyper-
cube Sampling (a statistical method for generating random parameters 
from multidimensional data), for a total of 1,000,000 simulations/ 
parameter sets. For each simulation we output the prevalence in each 
year for each compartment, accepting this parameter set if the output 
falls within the ranges of prevalence for humans in 2004, 2008, 2010 
and 2012, animals in 2012 and the environment in 2012. 
We also explore an additional analysis with a simple extension of the 
model in the supplementary information. This was performed to inves-
tigate the model’s sensitivity to the assumptions relating to transmission 
(and in particular when there is an absence of antibiotic). 
3. Results 
From 1,000,000 simulated parameter sets, 431 agreed well with the 
lower and upper bounds (Table 1) for the percentage of humans, animals 
and environmental samples colonised with resistant bacteria in Thailand 
(Fig. 2). The fitting bounds for the percentage of humans with resistant 
bacteria was underestimated in 2009, perhaps due to discrepancy in 
sampling methodology or a different sampling cohort [29]. The full 
description of the prior and posterior parameter ranges can be found in 
the supplementary information (Fig. S1). Note that certain priors are 
defined to be the absolute maximum and minimum possible (i.e., 
0–100%) in the absence of data for these parameters. 
3.1. The national strategic plan on AMR in Thailand 
Table 2 shows the potential predicted impact of reduction in colo-
nisation with resistant bacteria in humans via interventions starting in 
2020 and running for 20 years until 2040 (compared to the current 
standard of care). Over 20 years (2020–2040), the NSP-AMR in Thailand 
(which aims to reduce antimicrobial use in humans by 20%, animals by 
30% and increase public knowledge of AMR equating to an increase in 
all sanitary practices e.g. handwashing, safe drinking water, sewage 
disposal, waste water treatment plants by 20%) was estimated to reduce 
the number of humans colonised with resistant bacteria by 12.2% (95% 
credible interval: 6.0–18.8%, Table 2) from 2020 values by 2040. The 
NSP-AMR supplemented with an additional reduction in human-based 
ABU (to 30%) would reduce the burden of resistance (% colonised 
with resistant bacteria) within humans to a greater extent: to 16.7% 
(8.5–24.9%, Table 2) of 2020 values. The NSP-AMR supplemented by an 
additional increase in sanitary practices (to 30%, we predict an impact 
similar to reducing ABU by 30%: a reduction of 15.1% (7.4–24.6%, 
Table 2) from 2020 values. 
Without any ABU reduction, reducing all transmission rates in our 
model to 50% of their original value was predicted to reduce the number 
of humans carrying resistant bacteria to 13.4% (5.7–25.6%, Table 2) by 
2040. However, the impact of reducing only the transmission rates 
relating to water and the environment (human and animal transmission 
to and from the environment) on colonisation in humans was relatively 
low (0.1% reduction, 0.0–1.2%, Table 2). A 20% reduction in human 
ABU together with a 50% reduction in human-human transmission were 
projected to reduce the human burden of resistance by 13.9% 
(7.9–22.3%, Table 2), while a 20% reduction in human ABU with a 95% 
reduction in sewage or manure transmission was projected to reduce the 
burden of human resistance by 6.3% over 20 years (3.5–8.6%, Table 2). 
Fig. S2 shows the potential impact of simultaneously reducing ABU 
in humans and animals (in intervals of 10%; 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50%) 
and increasing sanitary practices (transmission remains at current 
levels, reducing transmission by 25%, 50% and 75%). In the absence of 
any sanitary interventions aiming to reduce transmission, achieving the 
NSP-AMR targets for ABU reduction would result in an impact of 7.4% 
reductions in human colonisation of resistant bacteria by 2040. 
Increasing sanitary practices to 25% would result in a 1.9-fold reduction 
in resistant bacteria colonisation in humans (to 14.2%), while increasing 
sanitary practices by 50% and 75% would result in larger 3.1-fold (to 
23.1%) and 6.5-fold (to 47.8%) reductions in the presence of the current 
Thailand NSP-AMR targets. 
3.2. Which factors contribute the most to human ABR? 
The maximum potential reduction in colonisation with resistant 
Fig. 2. Comparison of the model projections for animals, humans and the 
environment for the best 431 model fits (from 1 million samples). Error bars 
indicate data from which the model was calibrated (3/4 for humans, aside from 
2009) and shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence interval among all fits. 
Model parameters and their uncertainty ranges can be found in Table 1. 
Table 2 
Reduction in colonisation with resistant bacteria in humans between 2020 and 2040 for different potential interventions. The National Strategic Plan on Antimicrobial 
Resistance (NSP-AMR; 2017–2021) in Thailand aims to reduce antibiotic use (ABU) in humans by 20%, animals by 30% and increase sanitary knowledge by 20% (in 
2021). We investigate other hypothetical interventions aiming to reduce ABU in humans and animals and other transmission related interventions.  
Intervention or scenario Median reduction in colonisation with resistant bacteria in humans (95% credible interval) 
2020–2040 
NSP-AMR, Thailand 12.2 (6.0–18.8) 
NSP-AMR with 30% reduction in human ABU 16.7 (8.5–24.9) 
NSP-AMR with 30% increase in sanitary practices 15.1 (7.4–24.6) 
50% reduction in all transmission only 13.4 (5.7–25.6) 
50% reduction in water related transmission only 0.1 (0.0–1.2) 
20% reduction in human ABU with 50% reduction in human-human transmission 13.9 (7.9–22.3) 
20% reduction in human ABU with 95% reduction in transmission from sewage/ 
manure 
6.3 (3.5–8.6)  
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bacteria for humans from single parameters in the model are summar-
ised in Table 3 (more detail available in Table S1). While removing 
human ABU (minimum 0% ABU in humans) has the highest potential 
impact (65.7–99.7% reduction in colonisation of resistant bacteria over 
20 years), reducing human-to-human transmission (8.2–36.3%), animal 
ABU (1.0–16.8%) and animal-to-human transmission (1.1–17.1%) all 
have considerable potential impact. Environmental contamination and 
environment-to-human transmission were both predicted to have a 
smaller impact (<1.8%). 
Table S1 shows the maximum potential reduction in colonisation 
with resistant bacteria in humans for 30 scenarios, by their relative 
contributions to human ABR. The top four ranked scenarios were all 
related to human ABU (95% reduction in colonisation over 20 years in 
humans). The next highest factors were the rate of loss of resistant 
bacteria in humans (66.7%), followed by no transmission events 
(38.5%), simultaneous human-human/human-environment/human- 
animal transmission (17.9%) and human-human transmission alone 
(17.1%). 
The relative attributable impact on the burden of colonisation of 
resistant bacteria within human populations of human ABU compared to 
use in animals was determined to be 13:1 (13 times more impact could 
be achieved through reducing ABU in humans rather than animals, 
Table S1). This ratio decreased to 12:1 when accounting for all animal- 
based transmission. When comparing the relative impact of the human 
AMR burden to human-human transmission, the ratio was 6:1 (six times 
more impact of reducing human ABU compared to reducing human- 
human transmission) and comparing to all transmission routes in the 
model resulted in a ratio of 2:1 (two times more impact of reducing 
human ABU compared to reducing all transmission). 
3.3. Which factors contribute the most to animal and environmental 
ABR? 
The top ranked scenarios for both animals and the environment were 
all related to ABU in animals and antibacterial contamination of the 
environment, respectively (Table S1). Interestingly, removing all human 
usage (human ABU = 0) would result in a 3.1% reduction in animals 
colonised with resistant bacteria, but a much greater 32.9% of the 
resistant contamination of bacteria in the environment. Removing ani-
mal ABU (animal ABU = 0) resulted in a 95.4% reduction in animals and 
29.1% reduction in the environment, while removing environmental 
antibacterial contamination resulted in 0.8% and 96.0% reductions in 
colonisation in animals and the environment, respectively (Table S1). 
4. Discussion 
Prior to this study, an AMR literature review found that only 2% of 
published models (five from a total of 273) considered human and animal 
transmission concurrently, and no published model considered a third 
environmental setting [19]. To our knowledge, therefore, our study is 
the first to consider the One Health human-animal-environment axes of 
ABR. This is an especially important factor to consider as human ABU, 
animal ABU and environmental antibiotic contamination have all been 
shown to increase the prevalence of ABR [6,10,32,33]. We propose this 
simple model as a first step in understanding the complex picture [7] of 
One Health ABR, but our model framework includes assumptions which 
should be recognised, and thus these results should be interpreted in 
light of these assumptions. 
4.1. Limitations of the model 
First, prevalence data we used in the fitting of our model came from 
the six separate studies available in the literature – each with varying 
methodologies and cohorts. We did, however, explore the reliability of 
each of these national Thai estimates from 2004 to 2013 with a 95% 
confidence interval calculated for each reported data point – ensuring 
that we accounted for differences between these studies. There is a 
paucity of data on the transmission of bacteria between the different 
compartments in any One Health system, and no information at all for 
the situation in Thailand. Instead, we assumed a hierarchy of trans-
mission based on other published studies from other countries. For 
example, we used a study of shared bacterial genera (those bacteria from 
similar taxonomic composition) in Beijing, China [27] to inform the 
assumption that environment-to-animal transmission is greater or equal 
to that of environment-to-human transmission. We also used a wide 
range of potential estimates (with 95% confidence intervals) and 
explored every possibility of all underlying parameters. 
Our model primarily considers ABR bacteria transmitted via the 
faecal-oral route and those carrying mobile resistance genes (i.e. ESBL- 
producing E. coli, which is a very common sentinel for ABR in a One- 
Health context) [24]. Whilst bacteria transmitted via faecal oral route 
make up a high proportion of the World Health Organization list of 
priority ABR pathogens [34], other types of resistant bacteria (e.g. 
MRSA) do not have an environmental reservoir, and indeed require close 
physical contact in order to transmit – so this model does not capture 
those resistance mechanisms of all resistant bacteria. Instead we focus on 
those bacteria which simultaneously affect all aspects of the One Health 
network [24]. The lack of fit-for-purpose data to inform this model may 
have skewed our results to favour humans as the most important factor 
(as this is where the data is most rich), and future data may clarify the 
complete role of animals and the environment in human ABR. Future 
models should extend our framework to these aspects and especially 
consider the setting-specific features of the population and their 
behaviour. This would result in a better understanding of the One Health 
drivers of ABR in human populations. 
Additionally, our simple framework made assumptions relating to 
how antibacterials interact with the transmission of resistant bacteria, 
with the absence of the antibacterial resulting in minimal transmission. 
This is, of course, an oversimplification of the underlying biological 
mechanisms of resistance. However, we argue that this is the simplest 
possible set of assumptions which capture antibacterial usage and 
transmission of resistance, and their potential interaction. The sensi-
tivity to this assumption was explored in the supplementary information 
(Table S3), where the addition of a new transmission parameter 
(transmission independent of antibacterial usage) was shown to lead to 
small reductions in the overall impact presented in the main text. The 
inclusion of this additional transmission parameter should be investi-
gated further in future theoretical modelling studies. In addition, we did 
not consider de novo selection of resistance to be significant throughout 
our study, however, future work should also investigate relaxing this 
assumption to include different mechanisms of selection. 
Table 3 
The maximum reduction in resistant bacteria within human populations when 
accounting for the effects of usage and transmission parameters. The maximum 
reduction can be achieved by totally stopping human antibacterial use and 
human-human transmission, but animal and environmental factors can still 
contribute significantly to reducing the burden of ABR within humans.  
Parameter Median reduction in colonisation with resistant bacteria in 
humans (95% credible interval) 2020–2040 













0.1 (0.0–1.4)  
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4.2. Applications of the model 
Widespread concern around the contribution of animal antibacte-
rials to human resistance is growing, perhaps due to the majority of use, 
globally, occurring within this sector [5,6], but the benefits of curtailing 
their use on human health remain unquantified [10]. Here, the potential 
absolute impact of limiting the use of antibacterials in animals was 
predicted to be far less than then limiting human medical use (13 times 
more impact achieved through reducing ABU in humans when 
compared to animals), but this ratio was decreased when transmission 
between animals and humans was accounted for (12 times more 
impact). This result suggests that while animal ABU has been high-
lighted as a major driver within human ABR [5], it is far more effective 
to reduce human ABU in the first instance. However, reducing human 
ABU may not be feasible in many cases: indeed, reducing animal ABU 
would also contribute to minimising the development of ABR within 
animals (67% to 100%, Table S1) with substantial knock-on implica-
tions for human health (up to an impact of 17% reductions by 2040). 
This suggests that animal antibacterials are still an important driver for 
human resistance (albeit not as important as human use). Reducing 
animal use of antibiotics should be considered carefully for welfare 
reasons, even when making minor reductions in use (this model does not 
suggest we should reduce use by 100%, rather that these results indicate 
which areas of the One Health system yield maximum potential impact). 
Limiting human ABU was six times as effective as reducing human- 
human transmission and twice as effective as reducing all transmission 
events. This suggests that interventions targeting reductions in ABR 
within human populations should also focus on improved hygiene and 
infection control (particularly for humans) in addition to curtailing ABU. 
Overall, therefore, we predict that the most effective method of 
reducing the burden of resistant bacteria in humans is to combine re-
ductions in ABU while simultaneously reducing transmission events 
between humans, animals and the environment, reinforcing the need for 
One Health approaches that consider all three. This finding agrees with 
the results of other studies: one such study found that animal ABU alone 
had little impact on levels of human ABR [26] while another found that 
resistance in hospitals could be better prevented by interventions 
simultaneously targeting transmission and antibacterial exposure [33] - 
however none of these studies considered ABU within a human-animal- 
environment One Health framework. 
The current NSP-AMR in Thailand (2017–2021) aims to reduce ABU 
and transmission simultaneously, which according to our results is the 
most efficient way of reducing the burden of ABR in humans. We show 
that successfully achieving and maintaining current targets [25] until 
2040 would result in a reduction of 6.0–18.8% in the number of people 
carrying resistant bacteria (assuming a 20% increase in sanitary prac-
tices to decrease transmission through ABR public knowledge). This 
impact is reasonable but could be improved by further reductions of 
human ABU (from 20% to 30%) (NSP-AMR; 8.5–24.9%). Alternatively, 
halving all transmission events alone (which depend on sanitary prac-
tices) without NSP-AMR targets being met was almost as effective in 
reducing ABR (5.7–25.6%). This shows that there are multiple alterna-
tives which could strengthen the current NSP-AMR in Thailand. One 
such alternative is a combined approach: the current NSP-AMR with 
50% reductions in transmission (compared to no change in sanitary 
practices) would be 3.1-times as effective in reducing human colonisa-
tion with resistant bacteria (median 23.1% reduction over 20 years). 
Fig. S2 may also be compared to the observed reductions in antibiotic 
use of 40% in animals and 9% in humans following the implementation 
of the O’Neill report in the United Kingdom from 2013 to 2017 [31]. 
When projecting the potential impact of reducing antibiotic use in ani-
mals by 40% and 9% in humans (approximated at 10% in our Fig. S2) 
until 2040, there would only be a 4.4% reduction in human ABR. Again, 
this would substantially increase if sanitary interventions to reduce 
transmission were also implemented alongside reductions in antibiotic 
use (up to 44.2% with 75% reduction in transmission). This shows that 
the general impact of restricting ABU can be greatly enhanced in the 
context of reduced transmission across various settings. 
While our model is initially developed for the context of Thailand 
(the case study for model parameterisation), these results are potentially 
generalisable to any country or region with a high prevalence of resis-
tant bacteria, including other Southeast Asian countries (22% preva-
lence of faecal colonisation with ESBL producing Enterobacteriaceae), 
African countries (22%), West Pacific countries (46%) or eastern Med-
iterranean countries (15%) [18]. However, it would be unreasonable to 
assume that each of these geographical regions share the exact param-
eters used in our Thailand study. For example, almost half of the Thai 
population are employed in the agricultural sector [35] and 30.1% of 
people use water from natural sources [36]; while some countries have 
similar demography, it will be important to collect parameter estimates 
specific for each country and region. However, ABR research in LMICs is 
characterised by data gaps as well as variability in data reliability, 
sharing and capacity [37]. In the absence of such data [37], this initial 
model may be used as a first step in understanding and evaluating other 
LMICs’ ABR strategies. Ideally, future studies would obtain country- 
specific data on ABR (particularly for LMICs) or regional data from 
these countries. Then, a similar data-driven approach could be used to 
predict and forecast future ABR interventions with higher degrees of 
certainty in each specific region. 
5. Conclusions 
Our model makes some important predictions which have direct 
implications for human health in the context of ABR. Our conceptual 
model identified that human antibacterials are the primary driver in 
human ABR, but that there are many such interacting drivers which, if 
targeted by the correct interventions, could have large implications for 
the wider ABR problem. Interventions which focus on reducing ABU in 
humans can yield much greater impact when run in parallel to improved 
hygiene and sanitation interventions. Future work is needed to develop 
this model framework and to capture high-resolution data on trans-
mission events between humans, animals and the environment, and to 
quantify the effects of ABU within animals and the environment on 
human health. This model has allowed estimation of the impact of the 
Thai NSP-AMR and has suggested where greater ambition in its targets 
could significantly increase its potential impact on ABR. We anticipate 
that the results of this modelling study will stimulate further discussion 
on One Health interventions within Thailand and across other LMICs. 
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